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Technology and Economic Performance:
A Rejoinder
by Murray Weidenbaum
Testimony to be presented
to the Joint Economic Committee
U.S. Congress
September 12, 1991
Technological progress is a prime driving force in the global economy, which
makes this hearing so appropriate.
But, the report of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government, which is a major focus of this hearing, is very disappointing. A
distinguished group, the Commission contains many old friends and former colleagues.
Its report raises important questions and makes some good points. However, it is
fundamentally wrong in urging a larger role for government where the public sector has
little capability and in ignoring the responsibilities that belong to government.
I have prepared a report with a different orientation and submit it for your
consideration. I'll summarize briefly.

Competitiveness
The United States does not have a competitiveness problem. Allegations to the
contrary do not justify a new federal role in technology. We do face a continuing
competitiveness challenge. I don't mean to quibble. American-produced goods and
services are more than holding their own in world markets. Our merchandise exports
rose 74 percent over the ten years 1980 to 1990.

Note: Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University in St. Louis. The views expressed are personal.
This statement draws on his forthcoming book, Small Wars, Big Defense (Oxford
University Press).

The United States does have a large, but declining, trade deficit. Merchandise
imports rose more rapidly than exports in the past decade. In large measure, this
reflects the fact that we are a high-consuming, low-saving society. This is an important
concern to economic policymakers, but it transcends the issue of competitiveness and
technology.
Surely our steady trade surplus in high-tech products belies the need for special
government help for commercial technology.

Existing Policy Toward Science and Technology
Like many other areas such as education and retirement benefits, federal
priorities on science and technology are arrived at indirectly -

by adding up

th~

parts

of department budgets that go for research and development (R&D). A change in
overall budget priorities can result in an inadvertent reduction in federal support of
science and technology. A shift from defense (with a high R&D content) to
entitlements (with no R&D) means a reduction in federal spending for R&D.
Nevertheless, there is no need for a "master plan" of federal R&D; NASA
should not expand just because someone in the White House is anxious to support
technology. But we should not ignore the adverse effects of large defense cuts on
R&D, especially on basic research, where private firms underinvest for good reason.
The Commission is misguided in urging DOD to spend more on basic research.
Offsetting increases should go to civilian agencies such as NSF.

Proposed Support for Commercial
Science and Technology
I have never met an advocate of socialism in the federal government. However,
quite a few people want to add a "teeny weeny" bit of government intervention to help
the business system work better. Over the years, numerous wasteful subsidies have _
been enacted- shipping subsidies, credit subsidies, synthetic-fuel subsidies. The
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Commission's proposals for government support of commercially relevant technology
fall in this category. Government has no capacity for choosing new technology.
One question is easy to answer: how would the government decide which
industries and projects to support? Government favors politically powerful, older
companies which have invested substantially in a Washington presence- and whose
employees fear for their jobs.
New firms may be economically strong, but they are politically weak. They
lack an extended record of political contributions or a large group of agitated
employees/voters. The result is an uneven contest that favors old-line business and old
technology over the new.
Former Senator William Proxmire, an active member of this committee for
many years, was fond of saying, "Money will go where the political power is. Anyone
who thinks Government funds will be allocated to firms according to merit has not
lived in Washington very long."
The U.S.-Japanese semiconductor agreement illustrates the danger. The
agreement helped some firms, but hurt our computer industry. The results were typical
of special-interest legislation, benefitting some sector at the expense of the national
interest.
Recall that in the early 1980s, the U.S. semiconductor industry outsold the
Japanese. The Japanese responded by investing more than the Americans. By the
middle 1980s, they began to outsell U.S. firms. Today, American companies are
asking for a handout. That is an unjustified reward for poor business judgment, a
terrible precedent for other companies to follow. Our answer should be clear: "Sorry
fellows, welfare is for poor people."
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The Boundary Between Government and
Private Initiative
There is a modest role for government in supporting technology -

issuing

patents and setting technical standards. Under our private enterprise system, private
firms decide where to invest and what risks to take.
Government should facilitate the flow of technology by creating a favorable
economic climate. That role needs to be improved. The obstacles that government has
erected should be reduced. What good would it do for the federal government to
support high-tech enterprises, if at the same time government erects statutory and
administrative roadblocks to the use of new technology? The hysterical reaction to the
use of the protein BST in increasing milk production is not unique. Witness the
spectacle of "consumer advocates" vehemently opposing the innovation because it
would reduce the price of milk -

and state legislatures caving in to this nonsense.

The United States boasts a world-class pharmaceutical industry. The
government's response? FDA and congressional committees are "cracking down" on
the industry. How will giving FDA unprecedented police powers accelerate the use of
technology?
Because regulatory agencies often "grandfather" existing products, the main
burden of expanding regulation falls on new undertakings and new technology. The
most useful federal action to promote technology is to eliminate some of these
governmental barriers.
The Role of Defense and Other Agencies
What should be the role of the Defense Department in promoting commercial
competitiveness? The answer is zero. The Pentagon should reduce the obstacles to its
procurement of state-of-the-art products available in commercial markets.
Some urge DOD to subsidize civilian technology because it is an important
user. There is no limit to that line of reasoning. The military marketbasket ranges
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from missiles to mittens, from ground support equipment to golf balls. Specialization
of labor still holds, which is why the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) works well- most of the time. DARPA should not become NARP A (the
National Advanced Research Projects Agency), with a diffuse mission extending to all
technology.
Lewis Branscomb of Harvard warns that defense R&D tends to be too slow, too
centralized, and too micro-managed to be transferred successfully to the private sector.
As an alumnus of the defense industry, I agree. Another federal effort to force-feed
the process is wasteful.
Moreover, using the military budget to support civilian technology will
politicize the process. Go no further than the Corps of Engineers for an illustration.
The Corps' military functions are first rate. Its civilian dam building, in contrast, is
embroiled in local politics.
Some urge the Commerce Department to invest more heavily in a technology
base. A federal civilian bureaucracy determining which areas of technology to support
is only marginally better than having the Pentagon do it.
The Carnegie Commission proposals do not deal with the fundamental
conditions that encourage investment in civilian technology -

lower cost of capital and

expanding economic opportunity. The increase in budget deficits resulting from the
Commission's proposals would make it more difficult to achieve those conditions.
According to a former Commerce Department official, business executives only
"want the government involved in high-risk, long-term, expensive, high-technology
research projects." But inevitably the political process will decide which lucky few are
"high-risk, long-term," and "high-tech." Politically weak companies by default would
not be "high-tech" or "high-risk" or "long-term."
My favorite recommendation to congressional committees considering proposed
new federal spending is still, "Don't just stand there, undo something."
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